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MEMO 104/84 
. Bruxelles, le 16 octobre 1984 
u;s. POLICY ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
1. A series of measures have been taken recently by the u.s. 
Administration to restrict th~ transfer of technology and the 
1 
~issemination of scientific information. These include : 
- the increasingly widesprud application of a "NO FOREIGN (NOFORN)" 
restriction to Oepartment of Oefense-sponsored conferences, symposia 
and ether industry-oriented meetings (for example, the requirement 
to be a u.s. citizen to participate at a Metal Matrix Composites. 
Course at UCLA in August 1983 and at an Ordered Polymers workshop 
at Dayton university, Ohio in November 1983) ; 
- restrictions on the dissemination of published information· 
(the diffusion of NASA Tech• Briefs restricted to us citizens only ; 
the removal of NASA records from DIALOG's "Federal Research in Progress" 
data-base btcause of a prohibition on "transmitting these records 
outside tne United States") ; 
- the imposition of restrictions on the transfer of technical data 
to specified countries on participants at meetings organised by 
private enterprises (for example, the "Non-Transfer Agreement" 
imposed on participants at the 1984 DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION'S 
.. 
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user Group 1 s 1984 European Symposium in Amsterdam) 
- the restrictions placed on private (·non-us ?> users. of the LANDSAT 
spa ce shuttle as a result pf t.he July 17, 1984, law (Al reported 
in the u.K. publication the ECONOMIST of July 21, 1984, these include 
the netd for Oepartment of Commerce approval Dtfort contact with 
non-u.s. cus.tomers, the u.s. Government •s right to inspect the 
company•s equipment and groun~ stations anywhere in the world, the 
obligatjon on the company to make the data obtained available, tree 
of charge, to an American Government archive to which anybody has access) ; 
- stricter criteria for the classification of information 
Ce.g. Executive Order 12356 of April, 1982 required restrictions 
to be 1MPOSed in all cases where reasonable doubt exists about the 
need for classification, expanded the number of categories of 
potentially classifiable information and made it possible to 
reclassify information previously made public> ; 
• difficulties for some foteign scientists to get entry visas. 
... 
2. Many of these measures are, it is understood, based on the powers 
provided by the 1979 Export Administration Act, the 1976 Arms Export 
Control Act, the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and the 1978 Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Act. Others appear to be based on the President's 
executive powers. 
3. The EAA is the broadest-ranging of these acts. It defines 
technology as "the information and know•how that can be used to de~ign, 
produce, manuiacture, utilize or reconstruct goods, including computer 
. 
softwaré and technical data but not the goods themselves" and provides 
for the e-stablishment of a "commodity control list", consisting of 
any goods or technology subject to ~xport controls, as well as a 
militarily critical technologies List. The renewal of the 1979 EAA 
is currently under examination in Washington. The Community and 
its Member States have made known their views on the various amend-
ments which· have been proposed. 
4. Although the Arms Export Control Act is principally concerned with 
the export of weapons technology it can also be used to control the 
1 
export of more general technologies, fo~ example, so~e semiconductor 
technologies and coding algorithms. 
5. The controls imposed on tne transfer of technology are justified, 
by the u.s. Administration, primarily on the grounds of national 
security. However, there is some suspicion outside the u.s. that 
the manner in which the controls are implemented may, in practise, 
give a competitive advantage to u.s. companies as' compared with 
no~-u.s. companies. They may well create ;~portant problems for· 
industry i~ the European Community~ 
6. The range of possibilities covered ~Y the measures referred to above 
would appear to give the u.s. Administration extremely comprehensive 
powers to control or, at Le~st, to exert a very strong influence on 
the transfer of teehnology not just direetly between the u.s. and 
another country but also between other countries as such if the ~ 
technology in question is subject to u.s. eontrols.! However, it is 
not completely clear to what extent such measures are implemented 
in practice and, if so, to what extent they have in fact affected 
the transfer of technology and scientific exchanges. 
7. The Community urgently needs to clarify the situation by a> establishinQ 
a comprehensive inventory of all measures which have betn taken or 
are curre11t Ly u'nder consideration, and b) assessing their actull 
impact. 
This cou~d probably be carried out most effectively by meens of an 
" 
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investigation carried out by the Member States mi'ss-ions in Washington· 
in cooperation with the Commission's delegation. 
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